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Objectives and Terms of Reference

for

the U.S. Delegation to

Technical-Military Experts Talks on Surprise Attack Safeguards

U.S. Basic National Security Policy states:

"Safeguarded arms control should be sought with particular urgency, in an effort to reduce the risk of war attendant on the increased possibility of achieving surprise and on the growth and proliferation of nuclear and strategic missile delivery capabilities. It should therefore be a major objective of the United States, in its own interest and as interrelated parts of its national policy, actively to seek a comprehensive, phased and safeguarded international system for inspection against surprise attack and for the regulation and reduction of conventional and nuclear armed forces and armaments; to make intensive efforts to resolve other major international issues because a comprehensive arms control agreement will depend upon the resolution of some of these issues; and meanwhile to continue the steady development of strength in the United States and in the Free World coalition required for U.S. security. As an initial step in developing this international arms system, the United States should give priority to early agreement on the implementation of measures designed to reduce the risk of general war. The acceptability and character of any international system for the regulation and reduction of armed forces and armaments depend primarily on the scope and effectiveness of the safeguards against violations and evasions, and especially the inspection system. Because in the future U.S. security will depend increasingly upon information and intelligence of Soviet military capabilities and intentions, the development of such an inspection system within the Soviet Union assumes, in and of itself, significance to U.S. security."

With this policy in mind, and consistent with the July 31, 1958, U.S. note to the USSR on a surprise attack safeguards conference, the U.S. Delegation to the conference should as the primary objective seek to produce an agreed technical-military assessment of the surprise attack problem, of the effectiveness of various measures aimed at reducing the danger of surprise attack, and of the technical inspection or observation requirements for assuring effective implementation of various methods.

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Assessment of the effectiveness of various measures should be sought from the standpoint of the contribution to: (a) lessening the chances of misinterpretation of intentions which could cause an "anticipatory" attack; (b) increasing the chances of strategic warning; (c) increasing early warning capabilities; (d) ensuring that a deliberate attack could not gain the overwhelming advantage of destroying the retaliatory capability of the side that had been attacked.

In addition to seeking an agreed technical-military assessment of the surprise attack problem, the U.S. Delegation can seek to achieve other objectives which would assist the attainment of U.S. Basic Security Policy with respect to disarmament. These include:

(a) Collection of evidence as to whether Soviet leadership is now prepared to consider seriously the implications of the development of missile and other weapons systems as they relate to the mutual problem of surprise attack; and in the absence of such to stimulate Soviet thinking on this problem.

(b) Determination of the degree of Soviet willingness to discuss in specific terms the technical requirements for verification and observation.

(c) Determination of Soviet willingness to identify the significant instruments of surprise attack which are legitimate "objects of control".

(d) Explore further the general state of Soviet willingness to permit observation and inspection within the USSR.

(e) Determine the elements of Western military posture

(f) Assess what limited first-step measures the Soviet Union might consider, which, while of limited value in reducing the surprise attack threat, would begin the process of opening up the Soviet bloc.

The U.S. Delegation may, if necessary, discuss the applicability of inspection measures to various areas for illustrative purposes only, but should do so in a manner which will not prejudice the boundaries within which such measures should be applied.

The U.S. Delegation will not be authorized to make any political commitments on behalf of the U.S. Government, and should restrict its discussions to technical-military factors.

The U.S. Delegation should prepare for the meeting on the basis of the following agenda. It should seek acceptance of this agenda in an appropriate form, and should proceed through successive discussion of the following phases in order that an objective basis may be established in each phase for the discussion in the subsequent phases.

I. Identification of the objects of control: The instruments of surprise attack.*

- A. Space vehicles and missiles
- B. Long-range aircraft
- C. Tactical aircraft
- D. Ground forces
- E. Missile-launching submarines
- F. Other naval forces
- G. Etc.

*It is not essential that agreement be reached on this list of objects of control to be discussed in the agenda, so long as the ability of the

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II. Means of Control: The Technology of Observation and Inspection.

In this phase of discussion the purely technical aspects of various means of observation and inspection might be examined. Their capabilities and their inherent limitations would be assessed. Among the important topics would be:

1. Aerial inspection
2. Ground inspection, including technological aids
3. Sea surveillance techniques
4. Acoustic and infra-red detection, rocket launchings
5. Long-range radar capability
6. Satellite reconnaissance

III. Evaluation of Results of the Application of Inspection Techniques to the Problem of Surprise Attack.

A. Observation and reporting alone, with the techniques in II above, (to be considered in relationship to the various instruments of surprise attack)

- (a) from the standpoint of increased knowledge of capabilities.
- (b) from the standpoint of increased warning of intentions.
- (c) from the standpoint of increased or surer early warning of actual attack.

B. Exchange of information, with verification and observation (to be considered in relationship to the various instruments of surprise attack)

- (a) from the standpoint of increased knowledge of capabilities.
- (b) from the standpoint of increased warning of intentions.
- (c) from the standpoint of increased or surer early warning

of actual attack.

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C. Observation and verification of hypothetical limitations on readiness, disposition, and numbers and types of units of the various instruments of surprise attack. In each case viewed from the standpoint of:

- (a) increased warning of intentions.
- (b) increased or surer early warning of actual attack.
- (c) increased security of the deterrent force.

IV. General Characteristics of Systems to Reduce the Threat of Surprise Attack.

A. Interrelationship of preceding elements.

B. Technical aspects of system and organizational requirements (communications, access, control posts, etc.)

- (1) for observation and reporting.
- (2) for exchange and verification of information.
- (3) for verification of compliance with limitations on readiness.
- (4) for verification of compliance with limitations on numbers and types of delivery systems.

C. Variations in technical requirements according to geographical characteristics, density of population, industrial development in the areas in which applied.

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* C. Technical evaluation of results of observation and verification of hypothetical limitations on readiness, disposition, and numbers and types of units of the various instruments of surprise attack. In each case viewed from the standpoint of:

- (a) increased warning of intentions.
- (b) increased or surer early warning of actual attack.
- (c) increased security of the deterrent force.

IV. General Characteristics of Systems to Reduce the Threat of
Surprise Attack.

A. Interrelationship of preceding elements.

B. Technical aspects of system and organizational requirements (communications, access, control posts, etc).

- (1) for observation and reporting.
- (2) for exchange and verification of information.
- *(3) for verification of compliance with limitations on readiness, etc., of delivery systems.

C. Variations in technical requirements according to geographical characteristics, density of population, industrial development in the areas in which applied.

* In its preparations the delegation will consider and recommend positions on possible measures or proposals in these categories which might come up during the technical discussions. For each specific measure or proposal, the delegation will on the basis of its analysis recommend a U.S. position, including whether the item should be treated as (1) outside the proper scope of the discussions, or (2) discussable in carefully defined technical aspects with political aspects or commitments excluded, if the groundwork has been laid by serious and fruitful progressive discussion of preceding sections of this outline.

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